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Abstract— Vessels cybersecurity is recently gaining momen-
tum, as a result of a few recent attacks to vessels at sea. These
recent attacks have shacked the maritime domain, which was
thought to be relatively immune to cyber threats. The cited
belief is now over, as proved by recent mandates issued by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). According to these
regulations, all vessels should be the subject of a cybersecurity
risk analysis, and technical controls should be adopted to mitigate
the resulting risks. This initiative is laudable since, despite the
recent incidents, the vulnerabilities and threats affecting modern
vessels are still unclear to operating entities, leaving the potential
for dreadful consequences of further attacks just a matter of
“when”, not “if”.
In this contribution, we investigate and systematize the major
security weaknesses affecting systems and communication tech-
nologies adopted in modern vessels. Specifically, we describe the
architecture and main features of the different systems, pointing
out their main security issues, and specifying how they were
exploited by attackers to cause service disruption and relevant
financial losses. We also identify a few countermeasures to the in-
troduced attacks. Finally, we highlight a few research challenges
to be addressed by industry and academia to strengthen vessels
security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vessels are likely the oldest long-range transportation means
used by humans to reach physically far locations, and it is still
the preferred one in many cases, including the movement of
goods—over 90% of the world’s trade is carried by sea—and
luxury entertainment, such as cruise experiences. Thus, large
vessels carrying thousands of tonnes of goods (e.g. oil tankers,
containers carriers) or a few thousand people definitively can
be considered as critical systems, requiring reliable and secure
computing and communication systems.
However, vessels cybersecurity issues historically have re-
ceived only minimal attention from both the shipowners and
the scientific community. The reasons are manifold, and can
be found in the late digitization of the maritime sector, the
heterogeneity of operators, the focus on availability rather than
security, and, finally, the widespread belief that cyber-attacks
to vessels offshore are technically difficult and hard to succeed.
Given the above scenario, the International Maritime Orga-
nization (IMO) first generally highlighted the major cyber-
threats in the maritime sector (MSC-FAL.1 /Circ.3, 2017).
Then, in the 98th session (June 2017), it took action, adopting
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the “Resolution MSC.428/98”, namely, “Maritime Cyber Risk
Management in Safety Management Systems”. This document
forces shipowners to address cyber risks and cyber-security
attacks in the design and the deployment of existing safety
management systems [1]—these objectives to be attained by
January 2021. Since this latter date, any vessel not conforming
to this regulation would not be authorized to sail—implying
relevant economic loss, as well as a threat to global trade.
Despite this mandate, the IMO did not clearly define the at-
tack surface of a modern vessel. Indeed, while shipowners are
currently oriented towards the strengthening of the manage-
ment systems, other areas are overlooked. For instance, severe
weaknesses implicit to the communication protocols used by
the ships are unknown to operating entities, hence potentially
nullifying the efforts to implement secure-by-design vessels.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution
investigating, in a comprehensive and structured manner, the
cybersecurity issues associated with modern vessel systems.
Specifically, we analyze the communication technologies and
computer systems used within large vessels, pointing out
several security issues rooted in their design and operational
mode. We also relate these vulnerabilities with recent incidents
and attacks involving vessels, and we identify the weak
points that any modern vessel needs to mitigate towards the
enforcement of the latest IMO resolutions. Finally, we indicate
mitigating countermeasures to the highlighted threats, as well
as future research directions to be addressed by industry and
academia to strengthen vessels cybersecurity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses the security vulnerabilities of communication tech-
nologies on vessels, Section III illustrates the vulnerabilities
associated with the computer systems on-board, while Sec-
tion IV focuses on the technologies used to improve people’
safety. Section V highlights challenges, countermeasures, and
future directions towards the realization of cyber-secure ves-
sels. Finally, Section VI tightens conclusions.
II. VESSEL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SECURITY
Traditional inland communication systems have not been
designed to guarantee network coverage offshore. Thus,
only a limited set of technologies are available for vessel
communications. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview.
While GNSS technologies enable location estimation (Sec-
tion II-A), critical bidirectional communication services in-
clude the Automatic Identification System (AIS) protocol
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2Figure 1. Overview of technologies used by modern vessels.
(Section II-B) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM)—
this one supporting higher data rates (Section II-C).
A. Global Navigation Satellites Systems (GNSS)
A key element of modern vessel systems is the real-time
location awareness provided by Global Navigation Satellites
Systems (GNSS) technologies. Any modern vessel is equipped
with a GNSS module, that can receive RF signals origi-
nated from Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites, located
[19, 000 − 23, 000] km above Earth. GNSS data, guaranteeing
earth coverage, are broadcasted unidirectionally at a frequency
of 2 Hz. Each satellite is synchronized to the exact system
time, thanks to atomic clocks, and transmits a navigation
signal containing the message delivery time and additional
information, including the deviation of the satellite from its
expected trajectory.
A receiver equipped with omnidirectional antennas detects
a combination of signals from different satellites and can
identify the single contributions. For each of them, based
on the exact Time of Arrival (ToA) (synchronized with the
clock reference of the transmitters), knowing the propagation
speed of the signal (the speed of light), it is possible to
obtain the distance from the satellites. A minimum of four
satellites are required to efficiently multi-laterate distances and
obtain a location. Given that perfect time synchronization is
not possible, a localization error is generally present, usually
not exceeding 5 meters in outdoor conditions with clear sky
visibility [2]. Note that, when employed for military use (ac-
cess is restricted to authorized parties), the GNSS can reduce
the error to less than 1 meter. Several GNSS technologies are
available, based on the community responsible for operating
and maintaining the satellites. Despite the most famous is the
Global Positioning System (GPS) operated by the USA, there
are equivalent systems, e.g., the Russian Global Navigation
Satellite System (GLONASS), the European GALILEO, and
the Chinese BEIDOU.
From the security perspective, commercial vessels rely
on civilian GNSS signals. Unfortunately, to boost message
availability at the receivers, the civilian GNSS was designed
to transmit messages in clear-text, without relying on any
confidentiality nor authentication mechanism. Moreover, since
GNSS signals are used as the timing source of many syn-
chronization technologies, the trajectories of the satellites are
publicly available. Therefore, they can be easily spoofed us-
ing commercially available Software Defined Radios (SDRs).
These relatively cheap devices can be tuned on the operating
frequency of the GNSS technology, and configured via freely-
available, open-source tools to transmit messages that are
indistinguishable from authentic GNSS signals. As shown in
Figure 2, since the legitimate signals are very weak at the
ground level, the forged messages can be easily super-imposed
to the legitimate ones, leading the receivers to estimate fake
locations [3].
Figure 2. Logic of jamming and spoofing attacks against vessels.
Despite these weaknesses are well-known, the vulnerability
of vessels to GNSS spoofing attacks received worldwide
attention only recently, due to anomalies detected in the
Black Sea area [4]. In June 2017, at least 20 ships located
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systems, with their receivers signaling either unstable locations
or positions on the ground, close to a nearby airport area. Thus,
vessels were forced to switch to manual navigation systems
and to resort to outdated systems to maintain their routes and
avoid collisions. GNSS is extremely sensitive also to jamming
attacks. Vessels can be easily approached by moving entities
carrying a device emitting noise on the GNSS communication
frequency. The power of the noise adds up to the power of
the legitimate signal, thus compromising the operation of any
GNSS technology.
B. Automatic Identification System (AIS)
AIS, proposed by the International Association of Light-
house Authorities (IALA) and part of the Vessel Traffic Ser-
vice (VTS), is a coastal tracking system mandatory on ships of
over 300 tonnes, but widely adopted also over ships of smaller
weight. It aims to broadcast the position, speed, movements,
and route of the vessels, to help them avoiding collisions [5].
AIS operates in the Very High Frequency (VHF) band, us-
ing the Gaussian filtered Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK)
scheme, and it guarantees a horizontal transmission range of
up to 74 Km, with a bitrate of 9600 bit/s. AIS uses two
channels: the 161.975 MHz, for ship-to-ship communication,
and the 162.025 MHz, for ship-to-shore communications. AIS
transceivers consist of: (i) a VHF transmitter; (ii) two VHF
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) receivers; (iii) a VHF
Digital Selective Calling (DSC) receiver; (iv) a positioning
module supporting GNSS capabilities; and (v) sensors con-
nected via standard marine electronic communications links.
The data are periodically broadcast, allowing all the compati-
ble vessels to enforce situation awareness and avoid collisions.
To overcome coverage issues, AIS has been extended further
to a space-based version, namely Space-Based AIS. Leverag-
ing AIS receivers located on Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites,
the messages can be relayed to the ground, extending the range
up to 400 Km.
While the intended purpose of AIS was to avoid vessel
collisions, today AIS is used for several cyber-physical appli-
cations, including identification, search and rescue operations,
accident investigation, remote tracking, ocean currents esti-
mation, and the protection of marine Critical Infrastructures
(CIs).
However, being designed in the 80s, AIS does not support
any security property, such as authentication and confidential-
ity. As discussed in [6], the protocol is vulnerable to different
attacks, including spoofing, hijacking, data manipulation, and
Denial of Service (DoS). An attacker could: (i) create fake
vessels; (ii) inject false ship details (e.g., position, speed, and
Mobile Maritime Service Identity (MMSI)); (iii) impersonate
vessels or port authorities; (iv) inject false information (e.g.,
false man-in-water alarms); and, finally, (v) send false collision
warning alerts.
C. Satellite Communications
SATCOM services are the roots of many services used on
vessels to guarantee safety and security. A generic SATCOM
system consists of four elements: (i) several space-based
satellites; (ii) many ground-based gateway earth stations; (iii)
a Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) antenna installed
outdoor; and, (iv) a Network Operation Center (NOC).
The satellites are the key elements of the networking infras-
tructure. They are typically located in a Geostationary Earth
Orbit (GEO) (height 35, 786 Km) above the equator, and they
are equipped with multiple communication technologies to
communicate with earth-based equipment and other satellites.
Typically, a GEO satellite exchanges data using the Ka-band,
in the frequency range [26.5 − 40] GHz, using narrow-band
modulation schemes. This allows re-using the frequency band,
compared to traditional wideband technologies. Alternatively,
the bent-pipe architecture is used, where the satellites act
as relays in Amplify-and-Forward mode, relaying the signal
between two gateways located on the ground. The satellites
can also use dedicated optic technologies to transfer data to
each other, as for LEO satellites operated by GlobalStar and
Iridium providers.
In maritime applications, the gateway earth stations and the
VSAT antenna reside together on the vessel, and enable direct
communication with GEO satellites at high speed, up to 506
Mb/s when using the most recent Ku-band (frequency range:
[12 − 18] GHz). To guarantee Line-Of-Sight (LOS) connection
to the satellites, the VSAT antenna is installed outdoor, in a
clear view of the sky with a given angular view, expressed
in terms of azimuth, polarization, and skew. This setup is
typically realized by the operator at the deployment time.
Motors and sensors on-board are used to orientate the antenna
towards the satellite. Finally, the NOC is maintained by the
satellite operator and provides coordination and maintenance
tasks to the satellite network. Thus, each ship is typically a
node in a network including also vessels of the same shipowner
and same satellite operator. Many maritime satellite providers
are available, including Iridium, GlobalSat, and INMARSAT.
INMARSAT, operating 13 satellites, is the most adopted
operator, as it is the only approved provider for the Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) technology.
The GMDSS specification, established in 1980 by the IMO,
evolved to include several systems, protocols, equipment,
and procedures useful to ease the rescue of vessels in dis-
tress. It includes: (i) transmission of ship-to-shore distress
communications via multiple communication technologies on
multiple frequencies; (ii) reception of shore-to-ship alerts; (iii)
transmission of maritime safety information; (iv) transmission
of vessel location; and, (v) exchange of generic navigation
information.
Overall, the degree of security offered by SATCOM strongly
depends on the specific protocols and operations deployed by
the operator. Since operators are private companies, the details
of the security protocols and procedures are always protected
by intellectual property rights, thus being hard to evaluate. To
name a few cases of vendor-specific security issues, a recent
study [7] discovered unencrypted connections between the
VSAT antenna and the gateway in DVB-S SATCOM networks.
Thus, when insecure services are used (i.e., POP3 e-mails or
HTTP browsing), privacy issues arise.
In the specific context of vessels, recent reports published
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operations enforced by INMARSAT are affected by severe
weaknesses [8]. The root cause of the vulnerabilities has
been found in the thraneLink protocol, a proprietary solution
within the SAILOR 6000 communication suite. Specifically,
the consulting firm found a backdoor enabling the installation
of an unauthenticated firmware update and malicious software.
Moreover, additional protocol-level vulnerabilities were dis-
covered in the Mini-C INMARSAT Terminal. Using specially
crafted messages, an attacker aware of these vulnerabilities
could disable the Ship Security Alarm System (SSAS), used
by vessels to signal piracy and terrorism attempts offshore.
Besides, additional physical attacks are possible, by simply
modifying the orientation of the VSAT antenna, thus denying
a reliable SATCOM link.
III. VESSELS COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY
Computer systems integrated into modern vessels include
specific hardware and software solutions to automate dedicated
functions, including navigation, propulsion, and fuel supply.
On the one hand, they provide the crew with a real-time and
reliable view of the state of the vessel, improving reaction
time and decreasing personnel costs. On the other hand, these
technologies increase the vessel attack surface, leading to
additional security concerns.
The automated systems operating on-board, summarized in
Figure 3, include a variety of elements [9]. The core is the
bridge, providing a unified view of all the systems operating
on-board. The bridge acts as the central point of a logical star
network, where information coming from peripheral systems
are integrated to provide a comprehensive view of the vessel.
Another important system is the Electronic Chart Display and
Information Systems (ECDIS), a computer-based navigation
information system used by officers to establish and maintain
the route, as an alternative to legacy paper nautical charts.
The ECDIS provides crucial services, including navigational
safety, automatic route planning, route monitoring, navigation
time, and route update management.
Additional peripheral management systems connected to the
bridge include: (i) the Cargo Management System, in charge
of managing goods loading and unloading operations; (ii) the
access control systems, including cameras and microphones for
surveillance purposes, alarm systems, and electronic devices
for the on-board personnel security; (iii) on-board machinery
management, automating the monitoring of mechanical sys-
tems, including propulsion and steering systems; and, finally,
(iv) the communication systems, including SATCOM, AIS, and
GNSS modules.
Moreover, the ECDIS provides continuous data record-
ing features, thanks to the interaction with the Event Data
Recorder (EDR). The EDR is an event logger allowing forensic
investigations when serious malfunctions and incidents occur.
According to Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations, the
EDR should provide minute-by-minute recording for the past
twelve hours of the voyage and the record of four hourly
intervals of voyage track for a period of six months. These
systems could be connected to shore-side networks for data
downloading and software updates.
Other computer systems are available, even if they are
mostly physically disconnected from the bridge. To name a
few, they include the crew welfare systems, integrating several
third-party computing systems used for ship administration
and crew welfare, and the passenger services management,
including the devices in possession by the crew and the pas-
sengers and used for boarding, access control, billing services,
luggage tracker, and entertainment.
From the security perspective, being vessels Cyber-Physical
Systems, the physical and the digital components of the system
are interrelated. Thus, attacks on the digital infrastructure
impact on the physical context of the vessel, and, at the
same time, physical attacks can disrupt the digitized systems
maneuvering and coordinating vessel operations. In particular,
the bridge is the most critical component. Gaining full access
to this system would enable the attacker to definitively control
the vessel, performing maneuvers, and altering the input from
peripheral systems. Severe service disruption could occur
also if the attacker takes full control of crucial peripheral
systems, including the EDR, cargo management systems, and
the on-board machinery management systems. For instance,
a ransomware controlling the vessel could block any door or
movement toward the land, holding passengers as hostages at
sea until a ransom is paid. On the physical perspective, an
attacker could tamper the sensors of the automatic docking
system, leading the automatic navigation systems to run the
ship into natural formations (e.g., underwater rocks), or human
infrastructures like bridges, ports, and other ships, using the
very same mass and speed of the vessel as a weapon [10].
News about attacks on vessel computer systems are widely
available. For instance, the “Guidelines on Cyber Security on-
board Ships” reported that a vessel designed for paperless
navigation was delayed from sailing for days after a malware
blocked its ECDIS system [9]. The crew members did not
realize the failure as a cyberattack, but simply as a technical
issue, and its resolution took significant time and efforts,
leading to relevant financial losses. Several shipowners also
reported that their ICT network was infected by ransomware,
causing service breakdowns [11]. Despite the involved compa-
nies revealed the least possible details (a disappointingly dif-
fused habit, theoretically reducing bad publicity, but practically
preventing to assess the scale and impact of the phenomenon),
unofficial news reported unwitting ship agents as the source
of the malware, causing issues in several ports.
IV. SAFETY ON-BOARD
Vessels are technically sophisticated systems, characterized
by a considerable size. Thus, they need several crew members
on-board, holding critical roles to safeguard the passengers,
the vessel, and the goods.
Several use-cases are possible for the above scenario. For
instance, during the ship’s docking maneuver, failing of the
automatic systems could occur. In these cases, specialized
crew members are typically in charge of solving the problem.
However, if these people have any issue, the vessel does not
have any technology enabling a timely communication of the
event or the automatic handling of the emergency.
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Similarly, the unexpected absence of any crew member
during critical real-time vessel operations could not be au-
tomatically detected. At this time, the control room where the
bridge is located is mostly unable to realize personnel absence
and undertake a critical maneuver without being supported by
specialists.
To the best of our knowledge, the safety on-board is
currently addressed by relying on both introductory training
courses and legacy communication protocols. During the train-
ing courses, the crew members acquire general information,
such as reaction behaviors in case of fire, safety equipment
usage, and alarm signals meaning. However, no information
about the operation of communication systems is provided.
As per the communication protocols, the National Marine
Electronics Association (NMEA)-2000 is the wired commu-
nication standard adopted by vessels. It is a plug-and-play
technology (IEC 61162-1), allowing the connection of marine
sensors within vessels and their management through the
bridge. The standard is compatible with the Controlled Area
Network (CAN-BUS), currently employed in many vessels to
manage several peripheral systems, including the steering and
the alarm systems.
The implementation of a standard communication protocol
on-board allows automating many of the tasks that, until a few
decades ago, were purely manual. However, the CAN-BUS
was designed in the 80s; thus, the technology proves not to
be up to today’s cyber-security challenges. Among the many
limitations, the protocol provides neither authentication nor
confidentiality of messages. Thus, as shown in Figure 4, any
compatible receiver attached to the system could read the un-
encrypted content of the messages and inject fake messages—
e.g., shutting down the systems, causing DoS attacks [12].
V. CHALLENGES AND ROAD AHEAD
Table I summarizes the security properties enjoyed (or
missing) by the communication technologies used on vessels.
Despite the vulnerabilities highlighted in the above table have
been addressed in other contexts, their integration in modern
vessels leads to several challenges (summarized in Table II),
due to the constraints peculiar to the vessel context. Detailed
Figure 4. CAN-BUS attacks. Compatible receivers connected to the system
can read and inject fake messages.
Table I
SECURITY PROPERTIES OF VESSELS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES.
Technology Confidentiality Authentication Availability
GNSS 7 7 7
AIS 7 7 7
SATCOM 7 3 3
CAN-BUS 7 7 3
motivations, challenges, and future directions stemming from
discussions with major players in the vessels production do-
main are provided below.
GNSS Spoofing Detection. The lack of message
authentication in civilian GNSS technologies exposes
vessels to GNSS spoofing attacks, leading them to estimate
inconsistent locations. Several strategies are available to
detect GNSS spoofing attacks. These techniques rely either
on multiple antenna schemes or on the analysis of the raw
GNSS signals, or on the cross-validation of GNSS-derived
locations with information from additional communication
technologies (i.e., cellular networks) [2]. However, these
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OVERVIEW OF SECURITY ISSUES AND POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES.
Security Issue Countermeasure
GNSS Spoofing Cross-Technology Location Estimation
(GNSS, SATCOM)
Electronic Warfare Anti-jamming Protocols
Non-Standardized
SATCOM Protocols
Standardization Efforts
AIS Spoofing Software Security Frameworks
Bridge System Assessment Standardized Security Assessment
Procedures
Malware Attacks Containerization
Automatic Safety Systems Wireless Sensing and ML
Wired Communication
Protocols Security
Physical Security Strategies, Access
Control
schemes are hardly applicable to vessels. On the one hand,
they require hardware modifications on systems already
deployed, leading to consistent hardware installation and
maintenance costs. On the other hand, vessels located off-
shore could hardly leverage positioning technologies other
than the GNSS. Therefore, future GNSS Spoofing detection
schemes on vessels should target non-invasive solutions,
requiring little (if any) hardware change to the already
operational expensive ships.
Electronic Warfare Mitigation. Electronic Warfare
scenarios involve several powerful attacks, where adversaries
use sophisticated tools to disrupt the operation of the
communication infrastructure of a given entity. In the maritime
domain, jamming vessels could have disastrous consequences.
Indeed, without access to the GNSS infrastructure and to
the SATCOM network, a vessel could easily lose situational
awareness and the capability to communicate with landline
systems, not relying on any further help than its personnel
and past generations equipment (e.g., physical maps). Despite
the availability of several anti-jamming schemes, vessels
require the adoption of non-invasive protocols, that should
be thoroughly assessed and contextualized in order not to
require expensive and time-consuming hardware change
operations, while providing seamless integration with current
technologies and ease of use.
SATCOM Security Standardization. The recent attacks
over SATCOM networks have revived the interest of
industries and academia towards the security of the satellite
communication links. To date, the high costs derived from
the manufacturing, deployment, and maintenance of satellites
have motivated the development of proprietary solutions.
Thus, the involved protocols are (despicably) mostly closed-
source and undocumented, and their security cannot be
evaluated from the scientific community—it may be worth
remembering that security through obscurity, while providing
a transient competitive advantage, in the long-run has been
shown to lead to critical breaches. Indeed, these limitations
indicate the need for standardization activities towards the
definition of secure datalinks for vessels SATCOM security.
While programs specific for other CIs are starting to arise
(see [13] for civil aviation), to the best of our knowledge, no
initiatives are scheduled for the maritime domain.
AIS Spoofing Detection. The AIS protocol provides
neither message authentication nor encryption, thus being
exposed to replay and spoofing attacks. Similar issues existing
for other wireless communication technologies have been
addressed thanks to application-layer frameworks, able to
provide authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality to the
messages. These cited strategies can be integrated into the
applications using AIS, leveraging the lessons learned by other
similar communication technologies (see IEEE 802.15.4 in
the IoT context). However, conjoint initiatives by shipowners
and operators in the vessel domain are needed to agree on
application-layer design guidelines and technical details, such
as the setup of a dedicated Public Key Infrastructure.
Bridge Systems Assessment. Considering the critical
role played by the bridge and the catastrophic consequences
that could arise in case of attacks, protecting the bridge
software against cyber-attacks must be a priority for
shipowners. Research efforts are needed in this field to
standardize the security assessment procedures, inheriting
experience from other CI domains (e.g., smart grids, aircraft),
and contextualizing the maritime requirements in security
frameworks characterized by a high level of automation.
Mitigating Malware Attacks. Similarly to other digitized
CIs, malware infections to vessel management and computing
systems could have a high pay-off for an attacker. Protecting
the security perimeter of a CI has been extensively studied in
the literature [14], and similar solutions could be integrated
into vessel systems as well. Given that the effective physical
separation and logical isolation among all the on-board
systems are imperative to contain the spread of potential
threats and the extent of damages in case of malware attacks,
global regulations and technical guidelines specifically tailored
to vessel systems are needed, to standardize interfaces and
interconnections among integrated systems.
Automatic Safety Systems. Although technological
innovations proceed at a high pace, their integration
into modern vessels is still in its infancy. Unlike other
moving assets (e.g., aircraft), vessels still largely rely on
human intervention to manage emergencies. This leads
to the necessity of introducing automatic emergency
systems, allowing responsive monitoring of goods and
humans onboard. Wireless sensor-based systems relying
on wearable embedded devices could provide a valuable
solution to the above issues. Thanks to short-range wireless
communication technologies, smart sensors can monitor the
physical conditions of the crew, enabling real-time personnel
localization and tracking. Moreover, optimized deployment
strategies can improve situational awareness during critical
maneuvers. For instance, a central computing system relying
on artificial intelligence could collect and analyze the
measurement, react to emergencies, and provide significant
advantages in terms of prevention, detection, and management.
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obsolescence of the current technologies makes protocols
introduced decades ago no longer fit to mitigate modern cyber
threats. Specifically, being proprietary protocols closed-source
and protected by intellectual property rights (e.g., the CAN-
BUS), their security evaluations is difficult, to say the least.
Hence, there could be hidden security threats getting along
for decades, as it has been recently shown [15]. This scenario
could lead to perilous use-cases where, besides cargo and
physical resources, even the safety of the crew members and
passengers is at stake. Thus, securing the interactions between
the centralized computing equipment and the mechanical
peripheral devices, as well as employing standardized and
secure (ideally wired) communication protocols, become
crucial security requirements, where their deployment could
rely on the results already available in the scientific literature.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mandatory adoption of cyber-security risk analysis and
related technical controls on all vessels by January 2021 forces
shipowners to start reflecting on a few key security elements,
including the threat model affecting the maritime domain, the
attack surface, and possible countermeasures. In this paper, to
the best of our knowledge, we highlight for the first time the
main weaknesses affecting the communication technologies
and systems used in modern vessels, shading lights on their
relationship with mainstream attacks carried out over the last
few years. We also summarize the most important research
challenges, directions, and countermeasures, to be addressed
by maritime operators towards the development of secure
vessel systems.
Despite the widely known security issues of wireless and
wired technologies are even amplified in the vessel domain, we
believe that vessels integrate a suitable variety of technologies
and the computational power to overcome such limitations,
meeting standard, and evolving towards more secure opera-
tional conditions. Though, this can only be achieved via a
stricter collaboration among maritime sector, industry, and
academia.
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